Re: letters to the editor from Tony Gull and Roger Lecuyer (St. Albert Gazette, Your Views, Nov. 21).
Equalization payments have a constitutional authority, Constitution Act, 1982, s.36. Its headings state both a commitment to promote equal opportunities and a commitment respecting public services.
Subsection (1) stipulates the autonomy of responsibilities for both provincial and federal governments to (a) promote equal opportunities for well-being of Canadians; (b) further economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and (c) provide essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians.
Subsection (2) commits the federal government to the principle of executive decision-making over equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.
Subsection (2) is why the federal government creates a general revenue pool from equalization transfers, Canada Health Transfer and Canada Social Transfer.
Subsection (1) is why there are no ties binding the use of equalization payments received by any province. The autonomy of each province to choose how to distribute money among its areas of jurisdiction is also constitutionally protected and recognized here.
Yet, there is an imperfect trickle-down effect by federal transfers to provinces, rather than to individuals. It is comparable to transferring money to the wealthy (provinces) in the hope that provinces will redistribute or trickle down those transfers to individuals over time. Would individuals use the money for the same choices as those imposed upon them by a recipient province?
Resources belong to the provinces under s.92(13) and s.92A(1)(a)(b)(c) Constitutional Act, 1867. While renewable resources such as hydro-electric power (Quebec, Manitoba) are not included in the current equalization formula, non-renewable resources such as oil and gas (Alberta) are included.
And federal politicians have historically altered the formula for political purposes since 1957. Since 1985, Newfoundland was partially compensated for inclusion of its offshore non-renewable resources. From 2004, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia had 100 per cent protection for offshore non-renewable resources from equalization payments for eight years.
Where are transfer expenditures needed? Considerations have included: (1) as social incentive to prevent Quebec independence, (2) as a tweak for industrialization in southern Ontario, (3) to offset costs in remote areas such as Baffin Island, the territories or northern areas of provinces, (4) to prevent interprovincial migration to Alberta. Considerations could include: (1) to provide dental care for everyone, (2) to reduce pharmaceutical costs for seniors, (3) to provide educational or employment opportunities for low-income individuals.
But why create perpetual recipient provinces whose powerful and influential fail to trickle down economic opportunity to provincial populations for health care and social security to all? Why use equalization to allow federal and provincial politicians to negotiate formulas for successful electoral campaigns while playing politics with people’s lives?
I submit equalization payments from the federal general revenue pool ought to be distributed directly to Canadians, rather than to provinces that have failed to allow the money to trickle down to the people it is constitutionally designed to enable. But would s.36(1) constitutionally protected provincial autonomy allow Canadians to choose what is best for them without paternal government decision-makers from either level targeting money (that is purportedly not tied money) for improper purposes?
Randy B. Williams, St. Albert
